This page lists every external review of Baofa's contracts, including automated ones, with its scope and outcome. It is updated whenever a review is received, before the fixes land.
Automated Scans#
Both scans were produced by AuditAgent, Nethermind's AI-generated scanning service. Its reports state that they are not a security audit and were not reviewed by Nethermind's security team; they are listed here as what they are.
| Scan | Date | Package | Findings | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10 | 2 November 2026 | baofa-contracts-2026-11-02-e7c2b6c: the foundation facets (admin, create, creator admin, trade), the diamond and interfaces, 28 contracts |
1 High, 5 Medium, 2 Low | 8 of 8 confirmed and fixed, one commit per finding with a proof of concept that fails before the fix and passes after it |
| 11 | 4 November 2026 | baofa-rewrite-2026-11-04-b042d86: the complete launch package, 72 files |
0 High, 4 Medium, 3 Low, 1 checklist note | 8 of 8 confirmed and fixed the same way; gate run 20261104T154521Z clean afterwards |
What Scan 11 Found#
| Finding | Area | Fix in one line |
|---|---|---|
| M-01 | token incentives: replacing the incentive coin redenominated outstanding rewards | every credit is attributed to its coin, former coins keep a parked ledger, and a coin change without a new time range is refused |
| M-02 | token incentives: changing the day length misindexed recorded volume | the day length is frozen until a new time range clears the arrays |
| M-03 | Frenzy: an admin withdrawal path moved vault inventory without accounting | the path is accounted and bounded by the same limits as every other vault movement |
| M-04 | token incentives: a claim during a zero-length pause re-stamped unsettled volume | the stamp moves only when no volume is open |
| L-01 | fee sharing: a zero-address shareholder could be finalised | refused |
| L-02 | fee sharing: an update could be blocked by pending pool fees | the sweeps run inside the create and update calls |
| L-03 | token incentives: closing a record deleted unpaid rewards | closing a record with unpaid rewards is refused |
| C-01 | an event misreported the balance after a claim paid through the WBNB fallback | the asset actually paid is measured and named in the event |
The full responses, with the register of findings, the reference comparison for each, the fix commits and the proofs of concept, travel with the review package handed to reviewers.
Manual Audit#
| Item | Status |
|---|---|
| Auditor | engaged by the protocol owner |
| Scope | the launch package baofa-rewrite-2026-11-04-a727bfe |
| Report | not yet published; it is linked here, in full and unedited, when delivered |
A Prior Professional Front-End Review#
The app's front end was checked against the findings of a prior professional front-end security review of a comparable wallet-connected application. Each of the 28 finding classes in that review was traced to this app and the result recorded in the app's verification log (web/QA.md in the repository), class by class, with the code or test that settles it.
| Outcome | Classes | Examples |
|---|---|---|
| Not present, with a test or code path named | 25 | a failed step reported as completed; a failed read shown as zero or an empty list; approvals simulated only after they were signed; revert data read from message text; narrow integers decoded as numbers; negative zero printed; one public RPC endpoint with no fallback; a content security policy missing a wallet transport origin; the receipt of a cancelling transaction accepted as a result; two flows passing simulation against the same allowance |
| Not applicable, because the construction does not exist here | 3 | a mock provider reachable on live routes, an access gate, a hand-rolled focus trap |
Three things the comparison does not close are kept on the same page of the log: WalletConnect is compiled in only once a project registered to baofa.fun exists; a live run of a smart contract wallet against the testnet deployment is still to be recorded; and which public BNB Smart Chain endpoints answer eth_simulateV1 is recorded when the mainnet RPC list is final (nodes without it fall back to a per-step estimate by design).
What the app does on every write, in one paragraph: it simulates the whole flow before the first signature, takes a lock per wallet and chain so two flows cannot pass simulation against the same allowance, waits for each receipt and tells a speed-up from a cancellation or a different transaction, decodes any revert from the revert data against the contract ABIs, and reports a failure after a confirmed approval as exactly that. Its content security policy allows scripts from its own origin only (plus two hashed inline scripts in this documentation hub), connections to the indexer, the RPC endpoints and the wallet transports it uses, and nothing else; telemetry hosts of the wallet SDKs are deliberately not allowed.
Reporting a Vulnerability#
A bug bounty programme and a disclosure contact have not been published yet; both follow the manual audit report and are announced on x.com/baofadotfun and in the Changelog. Every report received is acknowledged, fixed with a proof of concept kept as a regression test, and credited in the Changelog if the reporter wishes.